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Abstract 
The rebound effect refers to the phenomenon that energy savings from improvements in energy 
efficiency are lower than expected due to unintended second-order effects. Grasping specific 
mechanisms related to the rebound effect requires a good understanding of interactions between 
heterogonous agents on multiple markets. Otherwise, policies aimed at reducing energy use may 
render counter-expected and unforeseen consequences. In this paper, we propose a formal model, 
where technological change results from interactions on two markets: between consumers and 
producers in the market for final goods, and heterogeneous power plants in the electricity market. The 
analysis provides insights to the role of technological change, supply-demand coevolution, and status-
driven consumption in explaining the rebound effect. The model is employed to compare effectiveness 
of economic policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions associated with production of consumer 
goods, namely: a tax on electricity and ‘nuclear obligations’ to produce ten percent of electricity from 
nuclear energy.   
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1. Introduction 
The transition to a sustainable economy is unimaginable without restructuring the energy sector, in the 
context of its fossil-fuel dependency. Energy is a key variable influencing many economic trends, with 
energy-related carbon dioxide and other gases emissions affecting global climate. Still, the energy 
dimension of economic growth and industry dynamics is largely ignored in economic modelling ([1]; 
[2]). In fact, mainstream models typically do not account for energy, focusing on primary factors of 
production such as capital, labor and land. The exceptions are specialized models which treat energy 
as a constraint on economic growth (e.g. [3]; [4]). On the other hand, energy is an essential, and often 
the only, factor in production in ecological-economic models ([5]; [6]). None of these approaches 
provides a satisfactory explanation of linkages between energy and structural change in the economy 
[2].  
In fact, there is little understanding of specific channels through which demand and supply 
affect use, quality and composition of energy sources in production, and thus the environmental 
impact of different pathways of technological change. Neoclassical economic models are too abstract 
to deal with a changing structure of the economy because of their focus on static, equilibrium 
conditions and rationality of market participants [7]. On the other hand, evolutionary-economic 
modelling provides tools and concepts to frame complex dynamics, dissipative structures, and self-
organization processes.
1
 However, so far, only a few evolutionary-economic models have explicitly 
accounted for an environmental dimension of economic dynamics either by specifying energy as an 
input in production ([8]) or by introducing environmental components into utility of consumers ([9]-
[12]). The main message from such models is that consumers are key drivers of sustainability: 
environmentally conscious consumers, who attach high weights to environmental features (service 
characteristics) of products, may initiate their wide adoption and induce a shift in innovative activities 
of firms towards improving environmental dimension of their products. However, focusing on the 
demand-side factors alone overlooks symptoms of, instead of focusing on causes of, environmental 
harm. Sinn [13] argues that polices aimed at reducing demand for fossil fuels, such as carbon taxes, 
may paradoxically increase their supply. Resource owners, anticipating future polices damaging fuel 
prices, would extract their stocks more rapidly, this way accelerating global warming.  
All in all, the transition to sustainability requires changes not only in preferences of consumers 
but also in the composition of inputs for production, in particular a shift towards less energy-intense 
and less polluting energy technologies. Because of feedback mechanisms and increasing returns 
underlying interactions between various types of heterogeneous agents, it is not clear which polices 
can be the most effective in guiding successful transitions here. For instance, Bin and Dolatabadi [14] 
                                                     
1
 Evolutionary economics replaces neoclassical assumptions of rational, representative agents and equilibrium 
outcomes by notions of bounded rationality and out-of-the equilibrium dynamics due to the interplay of 
innovation and selection operating on diversity of technologies or behaviours. 
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shows that looking only on demand (direct) effects or supply side (indirect) effects may result in 
inadequate policy prescriptions aimed at lowering CO2 emissions related to different consumption 
activities. Moreover, energy savings from improvements in energy efficiency in manufacturing can be 
offset subsequently by second-order effects, such as an increase in output, referred to in the literature 
as the rebound effect [15]. So far, theoretical and empirical evidence related to the rebound effect, 
remains partial and inconsistent and lacking behavioral foundations.  
To our knowledge, no model so far has explored the complex linkages between different fuel 
sources in production, the process of endogenous technological change, evolving preferences and 
status-driven consumption. This is quite surprising given the urgency of tackling climate change and 
the need for a large-scale transition to a low carbon economy. To address this gap, we propose a 
formal model, where technological change results from interactions in two markets: power plants, 
producing electricity from diverse energy sources, and the market for final products. The latter is 
composed of heterogonous firms and status-seeking consumers. The model intends to replicate the 
main stylized facts of historical trends in the British electricity production (after liberalization of 
electricity market) and to explore the impact of consumers behavior on energy use in production. The 
stylized facts to be replicated by our model include: the change from coal to gas in electricity 
production, the decreasing spot price of electricity due to the entrance of new gas-fired stations, and 
the rebound effect in manufacturing.  
The proposed model builds upon a coevolutionary framework of demand and supply dynamics 
developed by Safarzynska and van den Bergh [16]. This is extended here by the electricity market. 
Electricity is then introduced as an input of production of consumer products. This approach is 
motivated by the fact that electricity is an important input in manufacturing, which can reach up to 95 
percent of total energy use for production, while there is little substitution between fuels in the 
manufacturing sector [17]. In our model, the electricity market is composed of heterogeneous plants 
producing electricity from diverse energy sources. In particular, three energy technologies for 
electricity generation are described in detail: gas, coal, nuclear, whose parameters are calibrated on 
data on the electricity industry in the UK. Over time new power stations can enter the market, while 
the decision about the size of installed capacity and the fuel type embodied in a new power station is 
based on the discounted value of such investments. Properties of this framework have been 
extensively explored in Safarzynska and van den Bergh [18]. The model proved capable of generating 
patterns which replicate well the transition from coal to gas in electricity production in the UK during 
the 1990s. 
In the market for consumer goods, a technological trajectory arises from the interplay of 
incremental innovation and the search for new product designs by individual firms, following the 
seminal work by Nelson and Winter ([19], chapter 12).  The important novelty of the model proposed 
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here concerns the way energy efficiency is modeled. In particular, we assume that energy efficiency
2
 
of incumbent plants does not change over time, but that new firms entering the market adopt more 
energy-efficient technologies than incumbents. This assumption is motivated by empirical evidence 
suggesting that changes in energy efficiency at the plant level are negligible compared to 
improvements at the industry level [20]. Our approach contrasts with other studies, where energy 
improvements are modelled as a shock, or an exogenous event, introduced at a specific point of time 
in model simulations (e.g., [21]). We find such methods insufficient for replicating empirical trends in 
energy use in specific industries. 
We employ the model to examine micro-channels through which improvements in energy 
efficiency may fail to bring about a proportional reduction in the amount of electricity used for the 
production of consumer products: vehicles and computers. The choice of these two manufacturing 
sectors is motivated by the fact that electricity dominates other energy sources in production of 
vehicles and computers. Although production of a car is not energy-intensive, many car components 
result from energy-intensive processes.  As a result, the negative impact of producing a new car on the 
environment can be very high. In fact, 10 to 20 percent of cars' total lifetime greenhouse gas emissions 
are being released during manufacturing [22]. On the other hand, computer manufacturing is energy-
intensive with the ratio of fossil fuel use to product weight equals 11, while this ratio is 1-2 for most 
manufactured products ([23]). In contrast with other home appliances, energy used during the life 
cycle of computer is dominated by production (81%) as opposed to its operation [23]. Herring and 
Roy [24] discuss the rebound effect related to the ICT technology.  
In both industries, the network effect is important for explaining consumer choices. The 
network effect implies that consumers imitate choices of others, i.e. evaluate the attractiveness of 
different products based on whether others have also adopted them [25]. We find that the network 
effect in consumption may be a source of the rebound effect. However, this effect depends on whether 
consumers tend to imitate brands, which are popular in their social groups, or goods with technical 
characteristics outperforming products bought by other consumers. In addition, we observe that the 
desire of consumers to distinguish themselves from others, by purchasing special status commodities, 
may increase energy used for production of consumer products.    
To examine these effects, we study determinants of the rebound effects in the presence of two 
different types of the network effect. The first one occurs through market shares. It implies that 
consumers assess the attractiveness of each product based on its market share, which can be 
interpreted as brand recognition. Brand is an important determinant of purchase of cars [26]. As 
technological standards of cars improve over time, segmenting the luxury cars based on their 
technological categories becomes increasingly difficult, causing the perceived image of cars to play 
                                                     
2
 As electricity is the only energy source in production in our model, by energy efficiency we understand 
efficiency with which firms convert electricity into output.  
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more important role in purchasing decisions of consumers [27]. On the other hand, in the market of 
computer hardware, consumers are more concerned about technological advances embodied in new 
products so as to keep up with others and technological progress [28]. We propose that under such 
circumstances, the network effect operates through comparison of technical characteristics. Formally, 
it implies that consumers aim at purchasing a product, whose technical quality is at least as good as, or 
exceeds, the performance of products adopted by the majority of others in their social group.  
In the paper, we study determinants of electricity used for production in model simulations 
with and without improvements in energy efficiency so as to assess the determinants of energy 
backfire. Energy backfire is a special case of the rebound effect, which capture a sufficiently large 
rebound effect rendering an overall increase in energy consumption (use). We derive policy lessons for 
the transition to a low carbon economy in the sectors where consumption is subject to network 
externalities. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the rebound 
effect. Section 3 presents a formal model composed of three heterogeneous populations: of power 
plants, producers and consumers. In Section 4, we analyze determinants of energy backfire in two 
specific industries: manufacturing of vehicles and computers. Section 5 examines the effectiveness of 
two policy measures aimed at lowering energy use in two industries. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The rebound effect   
It has been long recognized that policy measures, implemented with the aim of encouraging energy 
savings in production and consumption, can generate results opposite to expected. This phenomenon is 
known as the rebound effect (e.g. [29]- [34]). The effect goes back to Jevons [35], who suggested that 
improvements in efficiency of coal-fired steam engines would result in more coal consumption, 
ultimately offsetting the benefits from increased efficiency. In this case, the economy-wide rebound 
effect reached, or even exceeded 100 percent of energy savings, also referred to as energy backfire 
[15]. Empirical evidence regarding the direction and magnitude of the rebound effect varies greatly 
depending on whether analysis is conducted at the sector, industry or country level, the length of time 
period considered, and the type of formal model used for estimations ([36]-[40]; [15]). For instance, 
depending on the study, the precise estimates regarding the rebound effect in automobile use are 
between 0 and 89 percent. Recently, some sort of the consensus has been reached that the long-term 
rebound effect generally is between 10 and 30 percent [32].  
Van den Bergh [34] indentifies four fundamental reasons behind the rebound effect. First, 
improvements in energy efficiency relieve limits on resources (e.g. money, time), which can increase 
the energetic and material dimensions of the economy. Second, diffusion of energy-efficient 
technologies stimulates their wider adoption. Third, bounded rationality implies that individuals are 
unaware of the energy-intensities of their everyday actions and the indirect consequences of any 
energy conservation decisions. As a result, energy savings from reducing the frequency of, or quitting, 
 7 
 
specific activities can be offset by individuals shifting to other energy-using activities. Finally, 
population size, affluence, and technological performance are interdependent. That is energy-efficient 
technologies interact with various aspects of the economy in a way which may be difficult to foresee, 
also because of the complexity of socio-economic interactions.  
In general, the rebound effect can be classified as direct and indirect [15]. The direct rebound 
effect, which was first defined by Khazzoom [41], implies that improvements in energy efficiency 
encourage greater use of energy services. The so-called indirect rebound effects can take various 
forms, for instance [15]: embodied energy effects, re-spending effects, output effects, energy market 
responses or composition effects. The embodied energy effect describes the phenomena when energy 
savings, due to diffusion of energy-efficient technologies, are offset by energy spending on 
manufacturing and installation of these technologies. The re-spending effect captures increasing 
consumption of energy-intensive goods and services due to additional income from adopting energy-
saving technologies. On the supply side, producers may use savings from energy-efficiency to increase 
output, referred to as output effects. At the industry level, a large scale reduction in energy demand 
translates into lower energy prices, which encourages more energy consumption, called the energy 
market effect. Finally, the composition effect describes a shift in consumption from non-energy 
intensive towards energy intensive goods and services because of changes in their relative costs (as 
effective energy costs or energy price fall). In addition, macro-economic consequences of the rebound 
effect can be distinguished, such as economy-wide and transformational effects [42]. The economy-
wide effect captures adjustments of economic macro variables to changing energy prices, while the 
transformational effect relates to institutional and behavioural changes on the demand side as a result 
of technological progress and diffusion of more energy-efficient technologies.  
In general, formal models employed to study the rebound effect can be classified as top-down 
or bottom-up approaches. According to the former, energy savings because of efficiency 
improvements are calculated based on aggregated data at the sectoral (or national) level. The analysis 
requires isolating the rebound effect from other factors associated with energy savings, such as 
autonomous improvements in energy efficiency, the effect of earlier policies, or price-induced energy 
efficiency progress. This may be difficult to conduct in practice. In addition, changes in quality and 
composition of energy sources in production are likely to affect the strength, direction and magnitude 
of the rebound effect, which is often neglected in related theorizing. Kaufman ([43]; [44]) argues that 
the structural change towards high quality fuels may be a more important source of energy savings 
than improvements in energy efficiency.  
Alternatively, rebound estimates are based on bottom-up models, where technologies are 
represented in detail. Here, the choice of specific functions is likely to pre-determine the results. For 
instance, Saunders [45] argues that some production or cost functions are not flexible enough to 
conduct an analysis of the rebound effect, as they predetermine energy use as a result of improvements 
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in energy efficiency. In particular, he shows that some production functions are always fuel conserving 
(e.g. Leontief), while others are never conserving (e.g. Cobb-Douglass, Generalised Leontief). 
Formally, the fuel conserving condition requires that an increase in fuel efficiency decreases the 
marginal productivity of fuel, lowering its consumption. Similarly, it has been shown that the 
magnitude of the rebound effect is sensitive to the precise values of the elasticity of substitution (e.g. 
[45]-[46]). The degree of substitutability between energy and capital determines changes in energy use 
as a relative price of capital and energy changes [31]. Empirical estimates of elasticities of substitution 
vary greatly across studies. Broadstock et al. [47] review more than 200 empirical estimates of 
elasticities of substitution and find that studies offer different estimates even for the same sector and 
time period. This relates to the fact that it is difficult to distinguish between technical change and 
price-induced substitution, while many studies do not draw a distinction between energy and energy 
services, which all can affect final estimates. As a consequence, results on the rebound effect from 
empirical studies using specific production functions and parameters need to be interpreted with 
caution.  
According to the bottom-up approaches, studying the rebound effect relies on engineering 
calculations of technical parameters and cost estimates. This ignores behaviour of firms and 
households, and thus may be insufficient to measure the complete response of the economy. For 
instance, the saturation of consumer needs has been identified as an important factor behind the 
rebound effect ([48]; [49]). Lorentz and Woesdorfer [49] argue that technological change is likely to 
trigger the rebound effect only if needs of consumers are not satisfied by existing technologies. 
Otherwise, consumer choices are less sensitive to changes in prices and more to social considerations, 
such as social aspirations and satiation of needs. The proposition, although interesting, has not yet 
been put to an empirical test. 
Typically, demand- and supply-side aspects of the rebound effect are studied separately, as 
independent of each other. Only in general equilibrium models, the adjustments in production and 
consumption, as a result of improvements in energy efficiency, are accounted for in an integrated 
manner. However, these models rest on the assumption of representative agents (consumers 
maximising utility or producers minimising costs), which is not entirely consistent with the empirical 
evidence [32]. They ignore myopia of consumers, who often imitate others instead of constantly 
optimising their choices, as well as innovation on the side of producers. In addition, the direction of 
technological progress is exogenous in such models.  
Moreover, estimates of the rebound effect based on aggregate production functions, in the top-
down approaches, cannot help to unravel specific mechanisms and channels through which 
improvements in energy efficiency affect energy use in the economy. On the other hand, empirical 
evidence on the rebound effect from consumer surveys is focused on individual responses to changes 
in energy costs. This approach does not explain how changes in the latter impact preferences of 
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consumers and the direction of innovative activities by firms. We argue that these mechanisms are 
important for understanding the rebound effect. They can be examined in a coevolutionary model 
which accounts for interactions of heterogeneous agents on multiple markets, and we propose such 
model in the next section. The model is novel in a sense that it allows studying jointly the role of 
changes in the composition of fuels in electricity production, improvements in energy efficiency, and 
status-driven consumption in total energy use in the industry.  
 
3. The model  
3.1 An overview of model dynamics 
The proposed model is composed of two heterogeneous populations: ne electricity plants (the number 
of power plants is changing due to entry and exit of power stations) and market for consumer products 
composed of nfp producers of a homogenous, but highly differentiated good, and two classes of 
consumers: ncr members of the rich and ncp of the poor class. Time is discrete t=1,2..; each time unit 
corresponds to a period of 1 year. 
In the electricity market, three energy technologies compete for adoption: gas, coal and 
nuclear. Electricity production by each power plant is described by a Cobb-Douglass function, which 
accounts for substitution of fuel, labour and capital in electricity generation. Productivities of 
incumbent plants can change over time due to innovation and learning-by-doing. Output decisions by 
each plant are modeled as Cournot competition. In particular, power plants decide simultaneously how 
much electricity to sell on the spot market. Unlike in most other models of electricity industry, long-
term investments decisions about the size of and fuel type embodied in a new power plant are 
endogenous, based on the discounted value of investments.  
Demand and supply dynamics follow the approach proposed by Safarzynska and van den 
Bergh [16]. It contains some elements from models by [19]; [50]-[52]. In particular, following Nelson 
and Winter [19], two types of innovation processes are distinguished: incremental improvements in 
product designs and the search for radical innovation. Incremental improvements in product designs 
depend on firms’ experience in production, R&D activities, and accumulated knowledge. A firm may 
also engage in the search for a new design if its sales are very low. In the model proposed here, 
electricity is assumed to be an important input in production of consumer goods, which distinguishes it 
from the framework in Safarzynska and van den Bergh ([16]). 
On the demand side, consumer preferences change over time as a result of two disequilibrating 
forces: imitation of others, referred to as the network effect, and a desire to distinguish oneself from 
others, or a snob effect. The idea that the choices of consumers are driven by social considerations, 
such as status aspirations, conspicuous consumption and social comparisons goes back to Veblen [53] 
and Duesenberry [54].  
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Each time period, the following sequence of steps is repeated: 
1) In the electricity market, each plant chooses how much electricity to produce given an inverse 
demand function. 
2) The decisions by individual plants determine total supply of electricity and its price on the 
spot market. 
3) A new power station enters a market. It embodies energy technology (coal, gas or nuclear) 
which ensures the highest discount value of investments. The plant starts operating after the 
construction period. 
4) In the market for consumer goods, each consumer attempts to purchase a product that provides 
the highest utility: he (implicitly) ranks all offers and attempts to buy the most attractive 
product. If the supply of this product has run out, a consumer does not buy anything.
3
 
5) Firms collect profits and set the desired production level for the next period as a weighted 
average of past sales and actual demand. 
6) They purchase inputs for production (electricity and capital) given a desired output level so as 
to minimize total cost of production.  
7) Firms invest a fraction of their profits in R&D research towards incremental improvements 
(redesign qualities of their products).   
8) If a firms report zero sales for a sufficiently long time, they leave the market and a new firm 
replaces it. 
   
 
3.2 Technical specification  
Below, we describe specific assumptions made about interactions: on the electricity market in Section 
3.2.1; in the market for consumer goods in Section 3.2.2; and between two classes of consumers in 
Section 3.2.3.   
 
3.2.1. The electricity market (electricity production) 
In the electricity market, production of electricity is carried out in heterogeneous plants i characterized 
by age sit,, specific productivity νit and energy source j (coal, combined cycles gas turbines, nuclear), 
installed capacity ki, maximum lifespan
4
 Tj, and capacity factor λj. The latter captures periods of 
decreased production due to economic reasons (low profitability), obligatory maintenance, etc. 
                                                     
3
 Consumers purchase products in a sequence: rich consumers make their choices first, before poor consumers. 
The sequence is important because if the supply of a particular good falls short of total demand, it determines 
which consumers ultimately will buy the good. 
4
 The maximum lifetimes of plants operating at time 0 were drawn randomly from the uniform distribution over 
the range (10, 50). 
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Initially, the market is composed only of coal and nuclear stations to reflect actual shares of coal and 
nuclear energy in electricity generation in the UK at the beginning of the 1990s
5
. 
The structure of dynamics in the electricity market is as follows. At the beginning of each year 
t, plants set their production qit (given the capacity constraint qit  < λi ki) so as to maximize profits:  
ititititetit Fqmqp          (1) 
pet is the spot market price determined by a static demand function (below), mit is a marginal cost of 
plant i, and Fit represents a fixed cost capturing costs incurred by power plants regardless of the level 
of output produced.
6
 
The electricity price is determined by an inverse demand function:  
pet=a-bDt+θ                  (2) 
where demand Dt is equal to a total supply: 
i
ittt qQD , and a and b are parameters. θ is a 
random variable drawn from normal distribution N(0,1). Consequently, E(θ)=0. 
The production decision by electricity plants is modeled as a Cournot game ([55]; [56]). 
Accordingly, each plant decides how much output to produce so as to maximize profits (derived from 
0


it
it
q

): 
bn
Mmna
q
t
titt
it
)1(
)1(




.        (3) 
Here, nt is the number of power plants operating at time t. Mt is a sum of marginal costs of all power 
plants operating at time t.  
A plant exits once sit>Tj where Tj is the expected lifetime of a plant (defined for each energy 
technology). It is also closed if profits are negative. If the owner decides to close the plant, he loses its 
production capacity forever ([57]). 
After setting production, plants decide how many inputs for production to employ so as to 
minimize total input costs. Electricity production by plant i using technology j is described by the 
Cobb-Douglas function [58]: 
Fj
Fit
Lj
Lit
Kj
Kit
iiiaq itit

 ,        (4) 
where ait is the plant’s specific productivity; iKi*, iLi*, iFi* describe capital, labour and fuel input 
respectively. αKj, αLj αFj are corresponding substitution factors associated with technology j, where 
αKj+αLj+αFj=1.  
                                                     
5
 In 1990, approximately 65 percent of electricity in the UK was generated with coal and 21 percent with nuclear 
energy.  
6
 We set fix costs for all power plants equal to 1. This simplification does not affect dynamics of variables under 
investigation as the fix cost constitutes a relatively small fraction of profits in our model. 
 12 
 
The parameter ait is equal to 
Fj
itv

)
1
( , where vit is a thermal efficiency with which a plant can 
transform fuel into heat (energy).
7
 The thermal efficiency, which is a measure of plants’ productivity, 
can improve over time. Before each period, a random shock is drawn from the technology-specific 
distribution εi~N(μi,σ
2
i). A plant starts operating in the next period with a productivity equal to 
vit+1=vit+εt. This captures learning-by-doing: the longer the plant exists in the market the more 
efficiently it transforms basic energy inputs into electricity.  
Under the assumption that inputs are allocated according to their marginal productivity, inputs are 
equal:  
itFt
FjKjt
FjtKj
Kit vi
p
p
i


 , itFt
FjLt
FjtLj
Lit vi
p
p
i


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v
ppp
p
qi




 ,     (5) 
where pKt, pLjt, and pFjt and the prices of capital, labour and fuel j at time t respectively. We assume 
that the price of labour is equal to unity. This is a simplification, which allows us to examine impacts 
of relative changes in the price of fuel to labour on model dynamics.  
Prices of fuels change over time. In particular, fuel prices follow a geometric Brownian motion 
([59]): 
tjjFjt dZdtdp    ,                 (6) 
where σ is the volatility of fuel price j, Zt is a Wiener process and χ is a drift.   
 The marginal cost of plant i employing technology j is equal to: 
  
FjLjKj
it
LjFjKj
itit
FjLjKj
LtFjtKjtFjFjtKjFjtLj
it
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
           
(7) 
where p
o
j is the operating cost of technology j. 
In the beginning of each period, a new power plant enters the market. Formally, a planner 
evaluates capacity kij maximizing expected profits Vij for each energy technology j (adapted from 
[59]):  
))((8760()1((
1
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8
 
Here, Ij is a fixed cost per KW of installed capacity kij capturing initial investment costs and 
maintenance expenses. These costs need to be covered from the revenues over the entire life of the 
plant Tj. Furthermore, tsj indicates the number of years before plant i (embodying technology j) can be 
                                                     
7
 For nuclear stations thermal efficiency is defined as the quantity of heat released during fission of the nuclear 
fuel inside the reactor [62]. 
8
 This has been derived under the assumption that a plant can produce 8760 λi ki MWh electricity per year.   
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operationalized, jtmˆ  is the expected marginal cost associated with technology j at time t+1 (best 
frontier technology), and r is an interest rate. A new plant starts operating in t+tsj. It embodies 
technology j that ensures the highest value Vij.  
 An optimal level of installed capacity kij equals (derived from  
    
    
  ):  
 
2153475200
)ˆ(8760
j
jij
rt
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ij
b
mbQaeI
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s

 



,               (9) 
where Q-i indicates the expected level of production without a new plant.  
 Specific parameter values are described in the Appendix (Table A1). They were chosen based 
on historical data for the UK after liberalization of the electricity market over the period 1990-2002 
(before the New Electricity Trading Arrangements NETA replaced the pool). The proposed model 
proved capable of generating patterns which replicated well past change from coal to gas in electricity 
production, including: the decreasing prices of electricity over time, rapid diffusion of cheap gas-fired 
stations, and the decreasing size of newly installed power plants (Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 
[18]). These trends are illustrated on Figure 1-3 respectively. Figures 1-2(a) represents patterns of real 
data and Figures 1-2(b) compares them with data generated by our model simulations. Figure 3 
illustrates a decreasing size of newly installed power stations.
9
 Time step 1 in Figures 1b and 2b 
corresponds to year 1990 in Figures 1a and 2a. As our model replicates well tendencies of selected 
variables when compared to actual trends between 1990 and 2002 in the electricity market, we employ 
it to study the rebound effect. However, there are some discrepancies between real data and model 
results. In particular, the model tends to overestimates the size of new CCGT stations when compared 
to real data. A possible explanation is that during the period under investigation other than CCGT 
stations were installed in the UK (oil, oil, gas, or wind stations), which are not considered in our 
model. As a result, shares of electricity produced at gas-fired stations start to exceed shares of 
electricity produced at coal-fired stations occurs in 1997 in the UK, while in our model this effect 
occurs earlier, within 4 time steps. However, it is important to emphasize that our model of electricity 
market is an example of “history friendly modelling”. The aim of history friendly modelling is not to 
produce simulations that generate the quantitative values observed in the historical episode under 
investigation, but to replicate overall patterns from the appreciate theories of the historical episode 
([61]). The model replicates general tendencies of the system well.  
 
[Figure 1 a, b here] 
[Figure 2 a, b here] 
                                                     
9
 All figures in the paper illustrates model dynamics from the entire simulation run (100 time steps), with the 
exception of Figures 1-2. They depict dynamics from 12 time steps so as to facilitate comparisons with the real 
data.   
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[Figure 3 here] 
 
 
3.2.2 Firms in manufacturing industry  
In the market of consumer products, there are nf firms producing a homogenous, but highly 
differentiated, product. Each firm j offers a single product, which design xjt is randomly sampled from 
the range (0, ρ x~ ) at the beginning of each simulation. Here, x~  is the maximum attainable quality, and 
ρ a positive fraction.  
A firm j sets a target level of production for the next period as a weighted average of its 
current sales sjt and actual demand djt, following Windrum and Birchenhall ([51]; [52]): 
y~ jt+1=ζ djt+(1-ζ) sjt.        (10) 
Here, ζ and (1- ζ) are weights assigned to sales and demand, respectively. 
A price-setting mechanism follows a simple mark-up rule:  
pjt=(1+η) cjt,                     (11) 
where η is a mark-up and cjt is the unit cost equal to:  
   cjt= 
      
 
        ̃  
   
+q(xjt).
10
       (12) 
Here, θ is a fixed cost of production, which can include, among others, dividend payments to 
shareholder for their past investments, ejt captures electricity with  p
c
et  being price of electricity on the 
retail market, 
jtk
~
 is capital expansion at time t, pct is the price of capital (set constant throughout 
simulation runs)
11
, and q(
.
) is a monotonically increasing convex cost function of the jth design:  
q(xjt) =xjt
ν
,                      (13)
 
where ν is a parameter.  
The electricity price in the retail market is equal to: 
  p
c
et=(1+ηp)pet,           (14) 
where pet is the spot price determined by interactions of heterogeneous power plants in the electricity 
market, and ηp is a markup imposed by electricity retailers. Introducing electricity as an input in 
production is an important novelty of the framework proposed here, as an extension of the model 
developed in Safarzynska and van den Bergh [16].   
Production is described by a two-factor Constant Elasticity Substitution (CES) function:   
                   
              
           (15). 
                                                     
10
 The costs of a new emerging firm is: cjt= θ/yjt+q(xjt).
10
 
11
 Setting the price of capital constant allows examining an effect of changes in relative input prices (electricity 
and capital) on model dynamics. 
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Here, τj is the electricity efficiency of firm j, a is a share of capital in production, and q = 
   
 
, 
with σ being the elasticity of substitution between electricity and capital. Parameters a, τj and σ are 
randomly generated at the beginning of each simulation run and set equal for all firms. The choice of 
CES function is motivated by the fact that this function is most “rebound-flexible”, in a sense of being 
capable of accommodating different types of the rebound effect. Saunders [45] shows that the CES 
function depends on the value of the elasticity of substitution between energy and capital as compared 
to unity. We assume that energy efficiency τj of a single firm does not change over time. Instead, new 
firms entering the market adopt more efficient electricity technologies characterized by τt. The latter 
changes exogenously over time:  
 τt= τt-1(1+στ).         (16) 
Here, στ captures the annual change in technology efficiency, i.e. technological learning.  
Capital is subject to depreciation at the rate ξ: 
kjt=(1-ξ)kjt-1.         (17) 
Each firm expands capital Δkjt and employs electricity ejt so as to minimize the total cost of the 
desired level of production  ̃     (derived from conditions 
   
    
     and 
   
   
    ):  
          
   
   
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
     
 
   ⁄              (18)  
and     
 ̃    
           (
   
   
)
 
   ⁄
   
  
     
   
 
 
 
   ⁄  
 
 ⁄
   .     (19) 
In the model by Windrum and Birchenhall [52], profits are required to cover capital 
expansion. This assumption does not hold here. Instead, each firm employs as many inputs as 
necessary to produce the desire level of production and sets its price to recover the incurred costs. The 
implicit assumption here is that firms can raise financial capital to buy necessary inputs for production 
as long as there is demand for their products. Profits are used for investments in research activities and 
productivity improvements. Firm j’s profit πjt is equal to: 
  πjt =pjt s jt -c jt y jt .         (20) 
 After purchasing inputs for production, firms invest a fraction of their profits (if positive) in 
R&D activities ijt: 
 
  ijt =ς πjt.          (21) 
If profits are zero or negative, firms cannot afford undertaking investments in quality improvements. 
Otherwise, the quality changes according to a function of the length of the period during which the 
firm produces a particular good vjt, the maximum attainable quality tx

 at time t, and investments 
devoted to the quality improvements ijt:
12
  
                                                     
12
 The form of a quality function is modified from [50].  
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xjt=xjt ( tx

- xjt) 
δ
vjt 
ϊ
ijt 
ι         
(22) 
The parameter δ measures the speed of autonomous improvements towards the maximum attainable 
quality, ϊ denotes the competence elasticity; and ι is the elasticity of incremental improvements (from 
research activities).  
A firm that has not sold a single unit of production for ψ consecutive periods (ψ < γ) and 
intends to change its design, samples the quality from (0, tx

), where tx

 is the maximum attainable 
quality in time t, defined as a quality offered by the most technologically advanced firm ( tx

 x~ ): 
tx

=arg max{x1t, …,x nf},           (23) 
A new design cannot exceed the performance accomplished by the most technologically advanced 
firm in a current period. If a firm reports zero sales for γ consecutive periods, it leaves the market and 
a new firm replaces it. A newborn firm offers a quality sampled from (0, x~ ), which can exceed the 
quality of incumbent firms. This can be also interpreted as incumbent firms introducing radical 
innovations, which requires fundamental changes in their production techniques.   
 
3.2.3 Consumers 
The model distinguishes between two types of consumers, namely: the rich and poor classes. 
Consumers in each class are heterogeneous. Each consumer attempts to purchase a product that 
renders the highest utility. The utility evaluated by each consumer i from adopting a good j depends on 
the product quality xjt, its price pjt (cheapness), the network effect njt, and the number of poor class 
consumers purchasing a particular product ljt: 
uit= 

jtjt
jtjt
lp
nx
i
i
 
  
5.0 
.         (24) 
The parameter αi captures i’s inclination towards the product quality, and 0.5-αi is i’s inclination 
towards product cheapness. Its value is randomly distributed across consumers. In particular, it is 
sampled from (0, ώ) for each member i of the poor class, and from (ώ, 0.5) for the rich class members 
(0< ώ<0.5). This distinction is introduced to capture different attitudes of the rich and the poor 
towards quality and cheapness. The lower the value of αi, the less consumer i is willing to pay for the 
quality improvement. In addition, in the equation above, ζ is the network elasticity; and κ denotes the 
snob effect (equal to zero if a consumer belongs to the poor class), while ljt is a number of poor 
consumer purchasing product j in time t.  
The network effect is very important for the coevolution of demand and supply. It captures the 
tendency of individuals to imitate choices of others. Imitation allows saving on costs of individual 
learning, experimentation, or searching by exploiting information already acquired by others. 
Following others’ choices may be the source of additional advantages, such as the creation of a 
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network of users, e.g. the telephone and the computer industry. Katz and Shapiro [25] distinguish 
direct network externalities, which impact consumers utility directly as the number of purchasers of a 
particular good rises; and indirect network externalities, which affect the utility through the number of 
consumers purchasing similar hardware.  
Following the approach developed in Safarzynska and van den Bergh [16], we investigate two 
different forms of the network effect: through market share and comparison of technical 
characteristics. The network effect operating through market shares implies that preferences change 
depending on the number of individuals within the social network who have already purchased a 
particular product:  
njt= mjt-1,           (25) 
where mjt is the market share of firm j.
13
   
We assume that the reference group of rich consumers (the social network) is a group of rich 
consumers, while for poor consumers it is the total population.   
Next, we introduce the network effect through technical characteristics. In this case, a 
consumer tends to buy a good that satisfies or exceeds the threshold level for product performance in 
his social network:  
1 tjtjt xxn .          (26)  
Here, 1tx  is defined as the quality of the product purchased most frequently in the consumers’ 
reference group.
14
 In general, tx  
determines an individual’s threshold level for product performance, 
which a given product must deliver in order for a consumer to consider it. Such threshold levels are 
important where status-seeking consumers engage in interpersonal comparisons ([64]).  
 
3.2.4 Dynamics in the market for consumer products  
Below, we discuss the types of dynamics that our model tends to generate depending on whether the 
network effect operates through market shares or through technical characteristics. Figures 4 show the 
dynamics of sales of different products and Figures 5 of changes in total electricity use in their 
production (sum of electricity employed by all producers) in a baseline scenario with the moderate 
network and snob effects
15
. Figures 4 (a) and 5 (a) present results from model simulations with the 
                                                     
13
 If mjt = 0 then njt is set to 0.1 in order to ensure the visibility of new emerging products on the market.  
14
 If -1 <(xjt-1 - 1tx )<1 then njt = 1, while if (xjt - 1tx )<-1 then njt = 0.005. These assumptions imply that 
consumers are incapable to perceive small differences in product qualities. 
15
 Parameters under the baseline scenario are: the network elasticity 0.2; the snob elasticity 0.5; the 
substitution elasticity σ=0.02; the share of capital in production a=0.8; and the annual change in electricity 
efficiency στ=0.02. 
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network effect through market share, and Figures 4 (b) and 5 (b) from simulations with the network 
effect operating through technical characteristics.  
  The network effect – its strength and how it is conceptualized - is crucial for model dynamics, 
as shown by simulations by Safarzynska and van den Bergh [16]. In particular, the network effect 
operating through market shares renders clustering of consumer choices. In the presence of a strong 
desire of rich consumers to distinguish themselves from poor (strong snob effect), clustering of 
choices occurs around distinct products (Figure 4a). Here, the stronger the network effect, it is less 
likely that a new product will diffuse on the market, as consumers evaluate its attractiveness based on 
relative market shares. The latter are negligible for new products. Only if the network elasticity is low 
(close to zero), patterns of sales start to resemble the fashion market. On the other hand, dynamics of 
the model with the network effect through technical characteristics generates patterns resembling 
fashion markets, i.e. with cyclical market shares and short expected life spans of different firms, 
regardless of the strength of the network effect (Figure 4b). Here, new firms can attract consumers if 
they offer products whose performance outperforms that of incumbents.  
 
[Figure 4 a b here] 
[Figure 5 a b here] 
 
Figure 5 depicts total electricity used for production of all consumer products (in the 
industry) in two model versions. In the case the network effect operating through market shares, 
initially total electricity use increases (Figure 5a). This corresponds with a period of a decreasing price 
of electricity, which causes firms to substitute capital for electricity in production. After the electricity 
price stabilizes – electricity in production does not change over time. This can be explained by the fact 
that incumbent firms do not improve their energy efficiency, but only new entrants adopt more energy-
efficient technologies. Where the network effect operates through market shares, the stronger network 
effect (captured by the higher values of the network elasticity), the more difficult it is for new firms to 
compete with incumbents, which may prevent or slow down the diffusion of energy-saving 
technologies. On the other hand, where the network effect operates through technical characteristics, 
the ongoing entrance of new firms (utilising more energy-efficient technologies), renders electricity 
use to decrease over time.  
In the introduction, we proposed that the network effect through market shares describes 
consumer interactions in markets, where brands are important determinants of consumer choices. This 
is likely to be the case in the market for cars ([26]; [27]). It has been shown that self-image related to 
car ownership of the specific brand is especially important in the case of luxury car purchases ([65]; 
[66]). This partially relates to the fact that it is difficult to segment luxury cars based on their technical 
characteristics. On the other hand, the network effect through technical characteristics occurs in 
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markets, where technological progress is intense, while consumers seek to adopt newest technologies, 
and thus replace/update products regularly. This is likely to be the case in the market for computers. 
Here, consumers evaluate attractiveness of computers selectively, i.e. based on their technical 
components and design parts, rather than as a whole image as in the case of car purchases [67]. Tang 
([28]) shows that the process of purchasing a PC computer involves surveying information regarding 
its different components. In particular, consumers evaluate computers’ components comparing them to 
existing standards of PCs available on the market. In our model this effect is captured by consumers 
comparing technical characteristics of computers to the quality of the computer bought by the majority 
of others in his/her network.  
Our propositions imply that the rebound effect should be more significant in the market for 
vehicles than computers. In fact, the data suggest that between 1999 and 2006 the energy employed for 
production of computers decreased by 59 percent, while for production of vehicles increased by 6 
percent (own calculations based on [68]). Simultaneously, total output decreased in manufacturing of 
computers by 71 percent (measured by gross output, current prices), while production of vehicles 
increased only by 12 percent. These trends are accompanied by the standard deviation of annual 
growth rate in total energy use in production of computers being 18 percent, while of vehicles 3 
percent. This implies that changes in energy used for production of computers are more volatile than 
of vehicles, which may be interpreted in favour of our hypothesis. However, it is difficult to isolate the 
effect of efficiency improvements on energy savings from other factors, such as an increase in output. 
In our model, each consumer purchases only one product, so that total production is constant at the 
industry level. This simplifying assumption allows isolating the output from the efficiency effect in 
explaining energy savings.   
 
4. Determinants of energy backfire  
In this section, we study determinants of energy backfire using data generated by our model 
simulations. In particular, we analyse determinants of energy backfire by means of a linear regression 
with the dependent variable: net electricity savings due to improvements in energy efficiency. The 
estimated data were generated as follows: each simulation run lasts 100 time steps, which corresponds 
to a period of 100 years. Simulations were repeated 100 times for each version of the model (with the 
network effect through market shares and through technical characteristics) in the absence and 
presence of improvements in energy efficiency, in order to check the robustness of our results (i.e. a 
Monte Carlo analysis). In the beginning of each simulation run, parameters, which we identified as 
crucial for model dynamics in the initial simulations, were randomly generated within plausible ranges 
as described in the Appendix. This includes: snob and network effects, the rate of annual change in 
electricity efficiency (at the level of industry), the share of capital in production, and the elasticity of 
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substitution between capital and electricity in production. Parameters describing electricity markets 
were calibrated on 1990-2002 data from the British electricity industry (as described in Section 3.1).  
 The Table 1 summarizes the results from the OLS regression with the dependent variable 
‘indicator’. Summary statistics on the dependent and explanatory variables can be found in Appendix 
in Table A4. Formally, the indicator measures net electricity savings from improvements in energy 
efficiency at the industry level (over the entire period of model simulations) as the percentage of total 
electricity used for production of final products in the absence of such improvements. In order to 
compute its value, we repeated each of 100 simulations in the presence of improvements in electricity 
efficiency (στ≠0) - also in the absence of improvements in electricity efficiency i.e. (στ=0), for other 
parameters unchanged. The indicator has a form:  
 
Indicator= ∑
∑    
  
   
               ∑    
  
   
        
∑    
  
   
        
   
   
,                                (27) 
where ejt is electricity used for production by firm j at time t, and nf is the number of firms. 
 
The positive value of the indicator indicates energy backfire, i.e. an increase in energy use due to 
improvements in energy efficiency. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Below, we discuss the effects of the independent variables on energy backfire:  
 
Network effect 
The network effect captures the tendency of individuals to conform to choices made by others. Our 
results suggest that conformity is likely to make energy backfire more likely to occur (i.e. reduces the 
net savings from improvements in energy efficiency) by stabilizing consumption patterns. However, 
the variable turned out to be significant only in the version of the model with the network effect 
operating through market shares. Here, the probability of clustering of consumer choices is high as 
consumers evaluate the attractiveness of different products based on their relative market shares. New 
products have little chance to diffuse in the market due to their initially negligible shares. This 
prevents, or slows down, diffusion of more energy-efficient technologies over time, especially for high 
values of the network effect. On the other hand, in the model with the network effect operating 
through technical characteristics, the quality purchased by the majority of consumers in their social 
network determines product attractiveness. Here, model dynamics resemble fashion markets with 
cyclical sales of different products regardless of the strength of the network effect. As a result, the 
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network effect through technical characteristics turned out to be insignificant in explaining net savings 
in this version of the model.  
 
Snob effect 
The snob elasticity captures the desire of rich consumers to distinguish themselves from the poor 
through special status commodities. The variable turned out to be insignificant in explaining the 
probability energy backfire, most probably due to the low frequency of rich consumers in the 
population. The sign of the snob effect is positive in both versions of the model, i.e. where the network 
effect operates through market shares and through technical characteristics. Its positive impact on the 
probability of energy backfire can be explained by the fact that rich consumers tend to purchase more 
expensive products, which production turned out to be more energy intense. This phenomenon was not 
assumed at the outset, i.e. before running model simulations, but it was observed during the analysis of 
simulation output. The stronger the snob effect, the more wealthy consumers are sensitive to status 
than to price considerations. In general, “status products” are characterized by a positive price 
elasticity of demand. As a consequence, an increase in their perceive value as a status good may 
increase their sales. It is important to emphasize that decisions of rich consumers are influenced not 
only by price but also by qualities and market shares of products purchased by others, and thus the 
snob effect can be dominated by other factors.  
 
The elasticity of substitution between electricity and capital  
The value of substitution between electricity and capital has been generated randomly before each 
simulation run from the range (0,1). The elasticity of substitution σ below 1 implies that electricity and 
capital are poor substitutes. In fact, there is a large literature regarding whether capital and energy are 
good substitutes, and the precise value of the elasticity of substitution between the two ([69]-[71]). 
The empirical evidence suggests that the substitution between energy and capital is limited, and thus 
the elasticity of substitution lies most likely below unity [2]. A value 0.5 of the elasticity is most 
commonly used in empirical studies [45]. Our results suggest that the higher the elasticity of 
substitution between these two factors, the lower savings from improvements in energy efficiency, and 
the more likely energy backfire occurs. This result is consistent with the theory: the closer σ is to 
unity, the easier it is for firms to substitute capital for electricity as the price of the latter increases. In 
our model, the price of electricity is decreasing over time – due to the entrance of cheap gas-fired 
stations. As a result, firms tend to substitute capital for cheaper electricity. This effect is stronger, the 
higher the values of elasticity of substitutions, translating into lower electricity saving despite 
diffusion of energy-efficient technologies.   
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Share of capital in production and price of capital 
Values of the variable ‘share of capital in production’ have been generated randomly before each 
simulation run from the range of values between (0.8 and 1). The lower boundary of this range has 
been motivated by the fact that the share of energy in production of cars does not exceed 20 percent. 
Coefficients corresponding to this variable have a positive impact on the probability of energy backfire 
in electricity use in both markets. This is an interesting result, as it has been impossible to be examined 
analytically, before conducting simulations. The substitution of equation 10 into 19 shows that 
electricity use        
              
           (
   
   
)
 
   ⁄
   
  
     
   
 
 
 
   ⁄  
 
 ⁄
 )  depends on the past demand, and so 
on individual decisions of consumers. The variable has been significant only in the version of the 
model with the network effect through technical characteristics. Here, the higher share of electricity in 
production (and thus the higher share of capital) implies higher energy savings from improvements in 
energy efficiency.  
 
Annual change in electricity efficiency (in the industry technology frontier) 
The variable ‘annual change in electricity efficiency’ is statistically significant in explaining the 
probability of energy backfire. Its coefficient is negative in both model versions. This implies that as 
energy-efficiency increases at the industry level, less electricity is employed for production by 
individual firms. As a consequence, the faster improvements in energy efficiency translate into the 
higher energy savings at the level of industry, which is consistent with our expectations.  
 
5. Policies for reducing carbon emissions  
In this section, we discuss effectiveness of two types of polices aimed at reducing carbon emissions 
associated with production of consumer goods, namely: a tax on electricity in Section 5.1 and “nuclear 
obligations” in Section 5.2. Nuclear obligations require that a new nuclear power plant is installed in 
the electricity market whenever a share of nuclear energy in electricity generation is below 10 percent. 
This policy can be interpreted as a subsidy supporting nuclear energy.   
In general, carbon emissions associated with production can be cut either by reducing energy 
input in production or/and final consumption, or by substituting high-carbon by low-carbon energy 
technologies in production. To reduce energy use different policy options have been proposed in the 
literature, such as ([72], [34]): (1) information provisions, (2) regulations, (3) subsidies for energy 
conservation, (4) price incentives and (5) tradable permits. Instruments 1-3 are likely to be ineffective 
in preventing the rebound effect as they do not impose a ceiling on total energy use nor they raise the 
cost of energy ([34]). On the other hand, taxes increase the cost of energy, while tradable permits place 
a ceiling on energy use. Van den Bergh ([34]) claims that tradable permits are a superior instrument of 
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energy conservation, because they limit energy use directly. On the other hand, Stavins [73] argues 
that both approaches: taxes and permits carry more similarities than differences, and in the principle 
each instrument can be designed so as to be equivalent to another one. Still, it is not clear how taxes 
affect energy use in the context of complex interactions between heterogonous producers and 
boundedly rational consumers. The analysis in this section aims to address this gap.  
The second policy option for reducing carbon emissions relies on substituting high-carbon by 
low-carbon energy technologies in electricity production. The choice of nuclear obligations in Section 
5.2 is motivated by the fact that nuclear power has been considered in the UK as one of promising 
energy solutions to satisfy the rising demand while reducing carbon emissions since 1950s. 
Subsequently, the deployment of nuclear energy was supported by the subsidy from the government, 
without which nuclear power would have been at the edge of bankruptcy. It has been argued that if 
fossil fuel had replaced nuclear energy, the UK’s total carbon emissions from all sectors might have 
been 5 till 12 percent higher in 2004 [74]. However, such computations should be interpreted with 
caution as it is uncertain what energy consumption would have been in the absence of the support for 
nuclear energy. The model aims to provide insights to this question by comparing energy use in the 
absence and presence of nuclear obligations.  
 
 
5.1 Tax on electricity  
In order to assess the effectiveness of a tax imposed on electricity, we compare energy use in 
production of consumer goods in the industry (over the entire simulation run) in simulations with and 
without taxes (both in the presence of improvements in energy efficiency). We repeat simulations for 
100 times for different values of taxes from the range (0.1-0.9). Figure 6 illustrates the percentage of 
energy backfire depending on the tax level, i.e. the percentage of cases when energy use in the 
presence of the specific tax is higher than in its absence. Patterns in Figure 6 show that, in general, the 
higher value of the tax implies the lower probability of energy backfire. This result is supportive of the 
prevailing in the literature view that setting input prices right, so as they reflect the environmental 
damage, is likely to be an effective way to reduce a negative impact of production. However, our 
results suggest also that the effect of taxes on the probability of energy backfire is nonlinear in the 
presence of status consumption and network externalities. In particular, an increase in a value of tax 
from 0.5 to 0.6 or from 0.8 to 0.9 increases the number of instances of energy backfire in the version 
of the model with the network effect through technical characteristics. A similar phenomenon occurs 
in the model with the network effect through market shares after increasing a value of tax from 0.6 to 
0.7. This suggests that the efficiency of taxes needs to be studied with caution. 
To assess the determinates of energy backfire, we estimate the linear regression with the 
dependent variable ‘frequency of energy backfire’, defined formally as the frequency of cases when 
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energy use was higher in the presence of the tax than in its absence (for other conditions unchanged). 
Independent variables are defined as in the previous section. Table 2 summarizes the results. It shows 
that the higher is the elasticity of substitution between capital and electricity, the lower is the 
probability of energy backfire due to taxes. The result is consistent with our expectations: a tax is 
likely to be less effective the lower the elasticity of substitution ([31], [75]). This relates to the fact that 
a tax increases the price of electricity. The greater elasticity, the greater reduction in electricity use due 
to taxes. As a consequence, the probability of energy backfire is lower.  
In the version of the model with the network effect operating through market shares, the 
stronger the network effect translates into the lower probability of energy backfire. Here, clustering of 
consumer choices increases effectiveness of taxes in reducing energy use in production. In the 
presence of strong network externalities, individuals are less likely to change brands after an increase 
in their prices due to taxes. Simultaneously, taxes induce firms to substitute energy for capital in 
production. This effect was insignificant in the version of the model with the network effect through 
technical characteristics. Here, the higher values of the snob effect translate into the higher probability 
of energy backfire (although the effect is statistically insignificant). This implies that the tax on 
electricity is more likely to fail to reduce energy use, the more rich consumers desire to distinguish 
themselves from others. This relates to the fact that rich consumers are less concerned about price and 
more about status.  
[Figure 6 here] 
     [Table 2 here] 
 
5.2 Nuclear obligations  
In this section, we examine the effect of nuclear obligations on total electricity used for production of 
consumer products. The policy works as follow: if the percentage of electricity produced with nuclear 
energy (in the electricity market) is below ten percent, a new nuclear power plant is installed 
regardless of the net value of investments in nuclear plants. Although, in our model, production of 
electricity from nuclear energy is cost competitive, installing nuclear power plants is not. As a 
consequence, electricity market typically becomes dominated by gas-fired stations in the absence of 
any policy intervention. This is explained by the fact that gas-fired stations are the cheapest and the 
quickest to install. Again, we compare energy use (over the entire simulation run) in simulations with 
nuclear obligations and in the absence of this policy. Simulation results suggest that nuclear 
obligations significantly increase the share of nuclear energy in electricity production in both versions 
of the model. In the model with the network effect through market shares, the share of nuclear energy 
in electricity increased on the average (over 100 simulations) from 4 percent in the absence of nuclear 
obligations to 24 percent in the presence of this policy. In the version of the model with the network 
effect through technical characteristics, these numbers were 7 and 20 percent respectively.  
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Patterns in Figures 7a-c illustrate model dynamics with and without nuclear obligations (in the 
version of the model with the network effect through market shares). Nuclear obligations rendered a 
decrease in the amount of electricity generated soon after the policy had been implemented for the first 
time (i.e. when shares of nuclear energy in electricity production fell below 10 percent), which 
translated into a temporarily higher price of electricity (Figures 7 a and b). The drop in electricity 
production can be explained by the fact that, in the absence of nuclear obligations, investments are 
made in CCGT stations rather than in nuclear power stations, as CCGT stations are cheaper to install. 
As a consequence, the optimal size maximising the discounted value of investments in new CCGT 
plants (and thus their production capacity) is larger than the size of nuclear plants installed in the 
presence of nuclear obligations. Subsequently, the price of electricity is higher, as determined by the 
inverse demand function (equation 2). 
We examined an impact of changes in the price of electricity due to nuclear obligations on the 
amount of electricity used for production of consumer products. Figure 7c illustrates typical dynamics 
of total electricity used for production in the presence and absence of nuclear obligations. We found 
that nuclear obligations increased total electricity used for production of consumer goods in 2 percent 
of simulations with the model with the network effect though market shares and in 16 percent of 
simulations with the network effect through technical characteristics (out of 100 simulations). In the 
latter version of the model, in 1 case total electricity produced at coal and gas-fired stations in the 
presence of nuclear obligations was higher than in the absence of this policy. This result suggests that 
the efficiency of polices aimed at reducing carbon emissions associated with production of consumer 
products through promoting investments in alternative source of energy, e.g. renewable, needs to be 
interpreted with caution in competitive industries.  
 To examine determinants of energy backfire due to nuclear obligations in the version of the 
model with the network effect through technical characteristics,
16
 we estimate a logit model with the 
dependent variable equals 1 if energy use has increased and 0 otherwise. Independent variables are 
defined as in the previous sections. Table 3 provides information on the marginal effect of a unit 
change in the explanatory variables on the logarithm of the odds ratio, i.e. the ratio of the probability 
of energy backfire has occurred to the probability it has not occurred. Results suggest that only two 
variables are significant in explaining energy backfire due to nuclear obligations: the snob effect and 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and energy. In general, the higher the value of the snob 
elasticity the more likely energy backfire occurs, as the snob effect makes consumers choices less 
sensitive to price, relative to status, considerations. On the other hand, the higher the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and energy, the more likely firms are to substitute electricity for capital in 
                                                     
16
 We do not examine determinants of energy backfire due to nuclear obligations in the version of the model with 
the network effect through market shares because of the low frequency of energy backfire therein.  
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production after the price of electricity increases (due to nuclear obligations), which lowers the 
probability of energy backfire.  
 
     [Figure 7 here] 
     [Table 3 here] 
 
6. Conclusions  
To better grasp mechanisms through which improvements in energy efficiency may lower energy 
consumption requires a good understanding of feedback loops and increasing returns underlying 
demand-supply coevolution. With this purpose in mind, we proposed a coevolutionary model to 
examine determinants of the rebound effect. The framework is composed of three heterogonous 
populations: power plants, producers of final products, and two classes of consumers (rich and poor). 
Electricity is an input of production of final goods but also a final product produced by heterogeneous 
power plants embodying different energy technologies (coal, gas and nuclear energy). This is 
motivated by the fact that electricity is an important input of production in manufacturing, and it tends 
to dominate other energy sources in production as manufacturing technologies advance. Electricity can 
be produced from various energy sources, and thus a specific energy mix in electricity production 
determines the environmental impact of production in manufacturing.  
In the market for final products, improvements in energy efficiency are realized through the 
diffusion of new, more energy-efficient technologies. This is an important innovation of our 
framework suitable for studying the rebound effect. In other models, improvements in energy 
efficiency are typically introduced as an exogenous shock in a specific point of time, which does not 
allow replicating empirical patterns of energy use at the industry level. On the demand side, changes in 
consumer preferences affect the direction of innovative activities of firms. In particular, consumer 
preferences evolve over time as a result of two disequilibrating forces, namely: the desire to 
distinguish oneself from others through the consumption of special status commodities, captured by 
the snob effect, and the network effect. The later describes how individuals imitate others within their 
social networks. We examined two types of the network effect, referred to as ‘market share’, and a 
‘technical characteristics’. The network effect operating through market shares assumes that 
consumer’s choice depends on the number of individuals within their social network who purchased a 
particular product. We proposed that this type of the network effect describes well imitation in the 
market for cars, where brand recognition is an important determinant of consumer choices. 
Alternatively, the network effect through technical characteristics rewards the consumer for 
purchasing a product whose quality exceeds the performance of goods bought by the majority of 
consumers within his social network. This type of consumer interaction occurs at markets where 
technological progress is rapid and consumers tend to update their products on the regular basis, as for 
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instance in the case of computers. Subsequently, we examined changes in electricity use in production 
in two industries: manufacturing of cars and computers so as to assess determinants of energy 
backfire. Energy backfire captures a specific case of the rebound effect, which is sufficiently large to 
render an overall increase in energy use.  
The main results from model simulations can be summarized as follows: (1) the network effect 
and brand loyalty can prevent diffusion of energy-efficient technologies, increasing the probability of 
energy backfire; (2) the snob effect may undermine effectiveness of financial incentives, such as taxes, 
aimed at reducing electricity used for production of consumer products. This is because, for the strong 
snob effect, decisions of wealthy consumers are less sensitive to price considerations and more to 
status considerations; (3) the greater the elasticity of substitution between capital and energy, the 
lower probability of energy backfire; (4) in more competitive industries, policies for reducing carbon 
emissions associated with production of consumer goods are less effective than in less competitive 
industries.   
In particular, simulations with our model suggest that in the market for cars, the probability of 
clustering of consumer choices is high. New emerging products have little chance for adoption as 
consumers evaluate product attractiveness based on the established market shares, which are negligible 
for new firms. This can deter, or slow down, the entrance of new firms embodying more energy-
efficient technologies, contributing to the rebound effect. On the other hand, in the market for 
computers, consumers tend to purchase products which embody technological characteristics at least 
as advanced as products purchased by others in their social network. This results in intense market 
competition and encourages diffusion of energy saving technologies, increasing energy savings from 
improvements in energy efficiency. The effect can be partially offset by the snob effect. Our 
simulations revealed that in the presence of the strong snob effect, rich consumers are likely to 
purchase more expensive products, which are less attractive for poor consumers, and which production 
is typically more energy-intensive. As a result, the more rich consumers desire to distinguished 
themselves from others through purchase of special status commodities, the more electricity is used in 
production in the industry.  
Statistical analysis of our data revealed also that in both versions of the model, the faster 
improvements in the energy efficiency, the more energy savings in the industry, while the effect of the 
substitution elasticity between capital and electricity is the opposite. The latter result can be explained 
by the decreasing effective price of electricity, which causes firms to employ more of this input for 
production. This effect has dominated savings from improvements in energy efficiency in most 
simulations.    
Our results provide insights to policies aimed at lowering energy use in the industry. In 
particular, our analysis suggests that where brand recognition is important, demand-side policies 
should focus on creating a critical mass of adopters of products (e.g. through advertising or public 
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procurement), whose production is less energy-intensive than production of dominant firms. On the 
other hand, in industries, where technological progress is rapid and consumers seek to adopt the most 
recent technological advances, supply-side polices are likely to be more effective. Such supply-side 
policies include measures to encourage producers to invest in improvements in energy efficiency.  
Formally, we examined two types of policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions associated 
with production of consumer goods: a tax on electricity and nuclear obligations. The latter requires 
installing a new nuclear plant whenever the share of nuclear energy in electricity production falls 
below 10 percent. We found that the effect of tax on energy use is nonlinear, and thus increasing the 
tax may not necessarily translate into lower energy savings. In particular, the presence of the strong 
snob effect may undo energy savings from implementing the tax on electricity as it makes choices of 
wealthy individuals less sensitive to price relative to status considerations. Finally, we found that in 
computer industry, nuclear obligations may increase the amount of electricity used for production of 
consumer products. This effect depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital and energy. 
This effect is important to be taken into consideration when designing policies aimed at increasing 
shares of alternative energy sources in electricity production. 
Our framework offers a starting point for studying specific mechanisms related to the rebound 
effect, including the role of status consumption and technological change therein. It allows examining 
such mechanisms where the complexity of socio-economic interactions makes them difficult to grasp 
intuitively. In general, simulation results are sensitive to choice of specific functions. Therefore, it is 
important to explore implications of different modelling assumptions on the rebound effect in future 
research, for instance, of adopting alternative production functions in the electricity industry, as well 
as including more inputs of production in the market of consumer goods.  
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APPENDIX  
A1. Parameter values: electricity market 
A1.1 Energy technologies 
Energy 
technology  
j  
Description j=coal j=nuclear j=gas Source of data  
αk Elasticities of  
substitution   
0.452 0.876 0.2 [76]; [77] 
αl 0.077 0.035 0.07 
αe 0.471 0.089 0.73 
Μ Mean of the growth  
rate in thermal efficiencies  
-0.0009 0.008 0.005 own estimations, based on data 
from [62] 
σj Standard deviations of the 
growth in  
thermal efficiencies  
0.005 0.012 0.007 
vi0 Initial thermal efficiency  36.5% 37% 45.2% [71], Table 5.10 data for 1997 
max vit Maximum thermal efficiency 45% 40% 50% [78] for the period 2005-2015; for 
nuclear station sown estimates 
based on [78] data.   
 
χ -0.5σj
2 Mean value of changes in fuel 
prices 
 
-0.05 - 0.02 own estimations, based on data 
from [62] 
 
σj A standard deviation of 
changes in fuel prices 
 
0.07 - 0.06 
pj0 Initial price of fuel
17 0.611 0.5 0.706 
Tj Maximum lifespan 45 40 30  
poj Operating cost (p/kWh) 1.95 1.37  0.285 Own estimates for coal and nuclear 
based on [79]; gas estimate based 
on [80] 
tsj Construction time 5 6 3 [80] 
Ij Initial investment cost (£/kW) 892 1524 400 Own estimates for coal and nuclear 
based on [79]; gas estimate based 
on [80] 
λj Capacity factor  0.8 0.75 0.85  
 
A1.2 Other parameters 
Parameter  Description  Value 
A Parameter in the demand 
function 
50 
B Parameter in the demand 
function 
0.00025 
pe,min Minimum spot price 0.1 
pl Price of labour  1  
R Interest rate  0.08 
ne Initial number of power 
plants  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17
 We impose a boundary value 1 on fuel prices to prevent unrealistic escalation of prices over the next 100 year 
according to the 1990-2007 trends.  
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Table A2. Parameter values: producers 
Parameter  Description  Range/Value 
ηp A markup on electricity cost  0.25 
pct Capital price (10,30) 
yj0 Initial level of output*  10 
kj0 Initial level of capital*  10 
ξ Depreciation  
rate 
0.02 
ς A fraction of profits devoted 
to incremental innovations 
0.6 
ζ A weight attached to sales in 
desire production 
0.5 
θ Fixed cost 2 
ϊ Competence elasticity  0.03 
ι Incremental 
elasticity  
0.02 
δ Autonomous improvements 0.001 
v A parameter in the cost 
function 
0.5 
ψ Length of a period a firm can 
operate with zero sales before 
it engages in radical 
innovations 
5 
φ Length of a period a firm can 
operate with zero sales before 
it leaves the market 
7 
x~  
The maximum attainable 
quality  
50 
η A markup on price 0.25 
a A fraction of capital in 
production   
(0.2, 0.8) 
σ The elasticity of substitution (0,1) 
ρ A fraction of the maximum 
quality  
0.1 
στ Annual rate of improvements 
in electricity efficiency  
(0.01,0.1) 
nf Number of firms 5 
 
* indicated values describe initial conditions of new emerging firms and of firms existing in the beginning of 
simulation run 
 
 
Table A3.  Parameter values: consumers  
Parameter  Description  Range/Value 
Κ Snob elasticity Randomly generated from 
(0,1) for rich consumers; 
0 for poor consumers  
 
αi Price versus quality 
inclination 
(0 - 0.5) 
Ζ Network elasticity (0,1) 
Ώ Parameter 0.375 
ncp Number of poor 
consumers 
89 
ncr Number of rich 
consumers 
11 
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Table A4 Summary statistics.  
 
 
Mean Std. Dev Min  Max 
Indicator – the network effect through market shares -0.08 0.17 -0.78 0.03 
Indicator – the network effect through technical characteristics -0.49 0.21 -0.78 -0.02 
Network elasticity 0.49 0.30 0.00 0.99 
Snob elasticity 0.53 0.32 0.00 0.99 
Substitution elasticity (σ<1) 0.56 0.27 0.03 0.99 
Share of capital in production (a>0.8) 0.89 0.06 0.80 -.99 
Annual change in electricity efficiency (στ) 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.09 
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Table 1. Determinants of energy backfire 
The dependent variable: indicator  
 
The network effect  
through market share  
The network effect  
through technical characteristics 
Network elasticity 0.32* 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.52) 
Snob elastiicty 0.04 
(0.34) 
0.01 
(0.81) 
Substitution elasticity (σ<1) 0.12* 
(0.02) 
0.60* 
(0.00) 
Share of capital in production (a>0.8) 0.01 
(0.97) 
0.28* 
(0.05) 
Annual change in electricity efficiency (στ) -1.58 
(0.50) 
-4.60* 
(0.00) 
Cons -0.25* 
(0.002) 
-0.82* 
(0.00) 
N 100 100 
R2 0.42 0.83 
*variables significant at the 5 percent level 
p-values for z-statistics are in parentheses 
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Table 2. Energy backfire due to taxes 
The dependent variable: frequency of energy backfire Network effect  
through market shares 
Network effect  
through technical 
characteristics 
Network elasticity  -0.11* 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.55) 
 
Snob elasticity -0.04 
(0.37) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
Substitution elasticity (σ<1) -0.30* 
(0.00) 
-0.69* 
(0.00) 
Share of capital in production (a>0.8) -0.08 
(0.72) 
-0.36 
(0.55) 
Annual change in electricity efficiency (στ) -0.44 
(0.375) 
0.97 
(0.30) 
Cons 0.43* 
(0.04) 
0.87* 
(0.02) 
Number of observations 100 100 
R2 0.35 0.38 
*variables significant at the 5 percent level 
p-values for z-statistics are in parentheses 
 
Table 3. Energy backfire due to nuclear obligations 
Dependent variable:  
the log of odds ratio 
Network effect  
through technical characteristics  
Network elasticity  -0.00 
(1.00) 
Snob elasticity 2.35* 
(0.04) 
Substitution elasticity (σ<1) -5.48* 
(0.00) 
Share of capital in production (a>0.8) -10.73 
(0.07) 
Annual change in electricity efficiency (στ) -7.51 
(0.57) 
Cons 9.35 
(0.57) 
Number of observations 100 
Pseudo R2 0.31 
*variables significant at the 5 percent level 
p-values for z-statistics are in parentheses 
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Figure 1. The price of electricity purchased by manufacturing industry 
Source: Price to industry consumers by the size of consumer [63] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Real data      (b) Model simulations  
Figure 2. Shares of energy sources in electricity generation  
       Source: [63] 
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Figure 3. New power plants in model simulations, installed capacity by fuel source  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Network effect through market shares        (b) Network effect through technical characteristics 
Figure 4. Number of consumers purchasing different products 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Network effect through market shares        (b) Network effect through technical characteristics  
     Figure 5. Total electricity used for production of consumer goods in the industry 
Parameter values: network elasticity 0.5; snob elasticity 0.3; substitution elasticity σ=0.5; share of capital in 
production a=0.8; annual change in electricity efficiency στ=0.01 
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Figure 6. The probability of energy backfire due to the tax on electricity in models with the network 
effect through market shares and through technical characteristics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Total electricity produced    (b) Spot price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Total energy used in production    (d) Energy shares in electricity production  
     of consumer products                                 in scenario “nuclear obligations”  
 
Figure 7. Nuclear obligation. The network effect through market shares  
Note: Parameter values of the baseline scenario: network elasticity 0.2; snob elasticity 0.5; substitution 
elasticity σ=0.02; share of capital in production a=0.8; annual change in electricity efficiency στ=0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
